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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (1 Mar 74) DAMO-ODU

12 March 1974


Expires 12 March 1975

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 160th
Signal Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material, as appropriate. This report should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
3. Information on actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the HQ DA (DAMO-ODU) Washington, D.C. 20310, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 160TH SIGNAL GROUP
APO San Francisco 96491

SCGPV-UG-OP-PT

15 May 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 160th Signal Group
Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's observation, evaluations, and recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Drug abuse:

(a) Observation: Drug abuse continues to be a matter of Command concern.

(b) Evaluation: To date there have been 42 unit urinalysis tests throughout the 160th Signal Group. The average number of positives per sweep has been 3.6% of the personnel tested. The Group has one full-time Officer engaged in this field. Administrative discharges, formerly the responsibility of the Drug Abuse Holding Center, will now have to be performed by the individual unit. The reporting procedures for the Drug Program are redundant in many ways, and the reporting periods are irregular.

(c) Recommendation: That a consolidation of the myriad of reports that are required by Brigade be achieved to establish a more efficient system.

(d) Command Action: Continued command emphasis on the drug situation is stressed. In addition, various unit programs, catered to the needs of that unit, are encouraged.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) MACV Communications Center:

(a) Observation: During this reporting period the MACV Communications Center was integrated with the MACV AG message and distribution center. Among other things, the integration into a Telecommunications Center (TOC) entailed the responsibility of reproduction and distribution of message to the MACV staff.

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SCCPV-UG-OP-PT

15 May 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 160th Signal Group
Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(b) Evaluation: Prior to assuming the function of a TCC, the AG message center processed all incoming terminate messages by classification rather than by precedence categories. Upon integration, the handling times for terminated messages was very high due to the procedures employed by the AG section.

(c) Recommendation: That all messages be handled by precedence regardless of the position/section handling messages; and, that DA formulate an Army Regulation for message processing covering each operating element processing messages in order to make message processing uniform throughout the Army.

(d) Command Action: Extensive training was conducted and traffic flow studies were made. New procedures were implemented and all handling times were significantly reduced and message delivery efficiency was increased.

(2) Phu Lam Automatic Switching Center (ASC)

(a) Observation: During this reporting period the Phu Lam ASC had numerous magnetic drum problems.

(b) Evaluation: The majority of the problems experienced can be attributed to Read/Write errors. Drum #1 was operating satisfactorily, while many problems were encountered with Drum #2. In evaluating the problem it was discovered that #1 was received at the ASC in factory condition, while Drum #2 was not factory packed and was not clean. After further evaluation, it was determined that Drum #2 was previously used at the Nha Trang ASC and was shipped to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD) for storage after the ASC was deactivated.

(c) Recommendation: That Drums utilized by an ASC be new or factory reconditioned. Further, that the TOAD Drum Team visit each ASC every four months to perform Preventive Maintenance vice every six months.

(d) Command Action: Assistance was requested and obtained from the TOAD Drum Team. Numerous Read/Write heads were replaced and extensive T&D's were performed. Finally, a new Drum was obtained from USASTRATCOM-PAC and drum problems ceased.

(3) Use of paper insulated cable in underground installation.

(a) Observation: Paper insulated cable was installed in portions of the Long Binh Manhole and Duct System and later replaced with plastic insulated cable.

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(b) Evaluation: The paper insulated cable would not keep moisture from entering and damaging the cable during the interim period between installation and preassurization. The cable that was damaged by moisture had to be replaced with plastic insulated cable.

(c) Recommendation: Thuse use of paper insulated cable be severely limited in areas of extreme moisture such as Vietnam.

(d) Command Action: All paper insulated cable which showed signs of deterioration was replaced with plastic insulated cable.

(4) Long Binh Manhole Duct System:

(a) Observation: Distribution cables within the Long Binh Manhole and Duct System were programmed during a period of extreme fluctuation for telephone requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Distribution cable planning was not kept current with tennant needs during the period from engineering of the system to completion of installation and testing. This has led to a condition of unrealistic distribution for planned subscribers. This was caused both by contracting to a s-eparate civilian agency for operation of the Dial Telephone Exchange and by unforeseen problems which arose in the installation and testing phase of the project which unduly delayed completion of the project.

(c) Recommendation: That during a project of this magnitude, frequent surveys be conducted and plans revised accordingly. Also, build-up and phase down planning should be coordinated with the local Signal Officer to assure proper long range planning.

(d) Command Action: The Federal Electric Corporation has been contacted to provide a cable distribution survey for the Long Binh Manhole Duct System in order to incorporate necessary changes to the distribution.

(5) Realignment of COMSEC Logistics:

(a) Observation: The realignment of COMSEC Logistics in-country to accomodate personnel drawdowns has created a customer transportation and maintenance situation detrimental to its mission and security.

(b) Evaluation: With the closing of all CLSU's in-country, maintenance contact teams have been established to visit each Military Region on a monthly basis. However, there are times when a customer either misses the team or requires maintenance/DX between visits. To accomplish this the individual customer must travel to Long Binh via Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Traveling from TSN Air Base to Long Binh is, at best, marginal. As the draw down in Vietnam continues, it is projected that the contact teams will be decreased, both in personnel and in visit frequency, thus, causing customers to visit the CLSC-V facility more frequently.

(c) Recommendation: To preclude excessive and unnecessary travel and to minimize delay in service, CLSC-V should be relocated to TSN Air Base immediately. Site Octopus (69th Signal Battalion) meets the basic requirements of CLSC-V.

d. Organization: None.

e. Training: Training of Data Communications Switching Center Specialists.

(1) Observation: The Fort Monmouth Signal School teaches the following three different courses for MOS 72G:

(a) 72G20, titled a "Magnetic Tape Handler's Course."

(b) 72G30, titled a "Traffic Service Course."

(c) 72G40, titled a "Supervisor of Operations Course."

Courses (a) and (b) offer very little of the training required for personnel to efficiently operate an overseas AUTODIN facility without extensive training after arrival on site.

(2) Evaluation: Personnel are very weak in on-line operations and off-line routines. These two operations account for 75% of the work load in the MOS 72G. Personnel are also weak in manual reconfiguration, reloads, and forced restarts. Personnel from the 72G20 class which started on 13 October 1972, arrived on site with almost no AUTODIN knowledge whatsoever. There also seems to be a problem in getting enough hands-on time in the operation of the computer console equipment at Fort Monmouth to become even marginally familiar with the required operations.

(3) Recommendations:

(a) That MOS 72G20 and 72G30 be combined. Normally, extensive on-site training is required to train personnel in these specialties for ASC functions other than tape handling.

(b) That more school training be devoted to hands-on training to instill operator confidence in performing configurations, off-line routines, and restarts.

(c) That more classes on CARP procedures and DCA OPLAN 4-71 (Worldwide AUTODIN Restoral Plan) be included in the MOS 72G40 course to better prepare the supervisor for dealing with traffic management problems.

f. Logistics:

(1) Order, ship and receive time of critical parts:

(a) Observation: Units frequently request critical parts needed to remove equipment from deadline status without providing this Headquarters with MILSTRIP data.

(b) Recommendation: Requesting units furnish Group Headquarters information copy of all priority requisitions when submitted.

(c) Command Action: Continuous follow-up action to direct support units and higher Headquarters.


(2) Equipment and Supplies:

(a) Observation: Equipment and supplies excess to actual operational needs increase the problems inherent in standing a unit down. Extensive contingency plans often require maintenance of equipment and supplies at a level higher than usual operational needs.

(b) Evaluation: To facilitate unit stand down, all equipment and supplies in excess of actual operational needs must be turned in as soon as possible.

(c) Recommendation: That stand down units carefully plan and coordinate operational requirements in order to optimally phase out equipments and supplies. (The use of stand short requests for non-mission essential items facilitate early turn-in).

3 Incl
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ROBERT O. RUSHING
LTC, SigC
Commanding


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SCCPV-OP-FD (15 May 72) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 160th Signal Group
Period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, HQ 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384

TO: Commanding General, USASTRATCOM-PACIFIC, ATTN: SCCP-OP-OE, APO 96557

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



W. V. RICHARDSON
1LT, SigC
Acting Asst AG

CF:
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-00, APO 96375
Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade, APO 96384

AVHDO-00 (15 May 72) 2d Ind

18 AUG 1972


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 160th Signal Group, ~~Basic~~
Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam/MACV SUPCOM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO San
Francisco 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the subject Operational Report - Lessons Learned
and concurs with the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


PETER H. RODDA
1LT AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:

2- ACSFOR, DA, WASH, D.C. 20310

SCCP-OP-OE (15 May 72) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) of 160th Sig Gp,
Period Ending 30 Apr 72, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command-Pacific, APO
San Francisco 96557 **30 AUG 1972**

THRU: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-
FD, APO 96558
Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications Command,
ATTN: SCC-POA-OE, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. This headquarters has reviewed the report and preceding indorsements and concurs as indorsed.
3. Second indorsement of this report was inadvertently submitted to Headquarters, United States Army Pacific vice this headquarters. This indorsement places the report in proper administrative/command channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. B. Dorn
W. B. DORNY
11T, AGC
Asst AG

GPOP-FD (15 May 72) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for HQ 160th
Signal Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

21 SEP 1972

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Strategic Communications
Command, ATTN: SCC-POA-OE, Ft Huachuca, Arizona 85613

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

Michael A. Welch

MICHAEL A. WELCH
2LT, AGC
Asst AG


SCC-POA-OT (15 May 72) 5th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 160th Signal
Group Period ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR - 65 (A3)

Headquarters, US Army Strategic Communications Command, Ft
Huachuca, AZ 85613 ^{27 OCT 1972}

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) Wash DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for 
JOHN DUNLOP
Colonel, GS
DCSPOA

CF:
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
Commander, 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM), APO 96384
Commander, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGL-DST, AVHDO-00, APO 96375
Commander, 160th Signal Group, APO 96491
Commander, USASTRATCOM-PAC, ATTN: SCCP-OP-OE, APO 96557

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